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The completion of the Central and Eastern European accession process into the 
European Union (EU) in 2004 can in broad terms be taken to have been a 
considerable success in generating an enlarged European zone of peace and stability. 
But the experience of post-communist transformation within this region is in stark 
contrast to that in South East Europe where the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation at 
the end of the Cold War unleashed a bloody and devastating conflict which 
necessitated the military engagement of the international community and culminated 
in a NATO-led military intervention into Kosovo in 1999. Although the EU has 
aspirations to develop a military dimension to its external identity, its international 
presence continues to be articulated predominantly through soft power e.g. 
diplomatic, economic and normative foreign policy instruments. The next wave of EU 
enlargement – if and when it happens - therefore represents a crucial contribution both 
to the continued creation of a stable European Order and the credibility of the EU as 
an effective international actor.      
The then still European Community (EC) had demonstrated a high degree of 
misplaced confidence at the start of the 1990s in relation to responsibility for 
managing the emerging crisis in the Balkans when Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg 
Foreign Minister speaking on behalf of the European Council Presidency, announced 
in 1991 that ‘the hour of Europe has dawned’.1 This statement had come at a time 
when the EC was negotiating the Treaty on European Union and which would lead to 
the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By the end of the 
decade and in light of Kosovo, the EU’s ability to manage conflict in its own 
backyard had been exposed as a myth and Europe’s continued reliance upon a US 
military presence was clear for all to see. Lessons have been learned. The European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) established at the Cologne European Council 
summit in June 1999 acknowledged the need to develop an autonomous military 
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capacity to support its international presence and the policy of common strategies 
agreed two years previous at the Amsterdam European Council summit in June 1997 
recognised the need for greater coherence in EU foreign policy statements and the 
behaviour which flowed from them. The creation of a High Representative for the 
CFSP in 1999 as a means of coordinating the foreign policy positions of Member 
States was a further step forward in this direction as was the European Security 
Strategy published in December 2003 which highlighted the EU’s collective 
understanding of global security challenges.2 
Where the Western Balkans are specifically concerned, the EU plays an important 
role in peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations. In March 2003 the EU 
launched its first official peacekeeping mission, Operation Concordia, in Macedonia 
and this was followed by an EU Police mission, Operation Proxima, in December 
2003. Of more significance was the announcement of Operation Althea in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in July 2004 and commencement in December 2005 which transferred 
responsibility for peacekeeping activities from NATO to the EU. But if the EU’s 
growing military and police presence in the region is designed to maintain the status 
quo, the forward-thinking strategy is represented by the EU’s political strategy 
towards the region. Exempted in the main from EU assistance programmes for much 
of the 1990s, it was not until the cessation of military conflict that the EU began to 
channel assistance programmes towards the Western Balkans in earnest. The 
Stabilisation and Accession Process (SAp) launched at the Zagreb summit in 
November 2000 set out the ultimate goal of EU membership for the states within the 
Western Balkan region on condition that the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of a ‘stable 
democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities; 
a functioning market economy; and the adoption of the common rules, standards and 
policies that make up the body of EU law’ be met in full.3 The SAp has been 
supported by CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation) which has seen 4.6 billion Euro transferred to the region during 2000-
2006.4   
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The EU’s commitment to assisting in the preparation of the South East European 
states readiness for membership was reaffirmed at the Thessaloniki summit in June 
2003 and included the initiative to establish bilateral European Partnership 
Agreements which would build upon the previously negotiated Stabilisation and 
Accession Agreements (SAA) and would target assistance towards the specific goal of 
integrating the region into the wider European political and economic Order.5  
The report produced by the International Commission on the Balkans in April 2005 
succinctly summarises the dilemma facing the region. Although the Western Balkans 
are now relatively stable, the states within them remain weak and continue to 
experience low or negative economic growth, high unemployment and political  
corruption. Within the strategy of integration, the Commission concludes ‘the 
question today is no longer “what should be done?” We should clearly bring the 
region into the EU. Rather we need to establish the sequence of policy steps to be 
undertaken and the structure of the incentives that will make them work. We need 
policies so that the region can get on, get in and catch with the rest of Europe’.6       
But this agenda is far from controversial. Although integration for the Western Balkan 
region into the EU at the earliest opportunity is viewed in a positive light by the 
majority of observers, what is missing from the EU strategy is any firm commitment 
to a date by which the South East European states could anticipate membership. The 
frustration this omission provokes is reminiscent of the situation the Central and 
Eastern European states found themselves in during the early to mid-1990s and raises 
the danger of an emerging ‘expectation gap’ between the anticipated benefits of 
membership and the inability of the EU to deliver a firm commitment to accession. 
Furthermore, the intended ‘Europe effect’ or Europeanisation process fostered by the 
Copenhagen criteria are open to accusations of normative imperialism with the post-
modern identity of the EU at odds with the process of post-communist nation building 
and prevalence of ethnic nationalism. Both issues run the risk of alienating electorates 
and the governments they elect from the EU unless a timetable can be produced which 
provides tangible hopes for entry at some point in the near to medium future.  
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Bulgaria and Romania remain hopeful of their entry in 2007 and the decision taken in 
October 2005 to commence accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia open the 
door for Turkish membership from 2015 onwards and for Croatia in 2009. For the 
remaining states in the Western Balkans; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) and Serbia and Montenegro, the 
situation is less certain. The burden of meeting the Copenhagen criteria rests firmly 
upon the shoulders of the states in the region but the ability of the EU to absorb new 
member states is a factor which should not be underestimated. In this respect the 
prospects for an early entry of the South East European states into the EU were dealt a 
damaging blow with the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The EU, already 
suffering from enlargement fatigue following the mammoth efforts to ensure the 
success of the Central and Eastern European enlargement in 2004, entered a ‘pause 
for reflection’ during the UK Presidency in the latter part of 2005 and it remains 
unclear whether there is sufficient political will to facilitate the necessary institutional 
and financial reform that would allow the EU to continue to expand its membership.  
 
The next wave of enlargement thus represents a journey which is far from completion 
and in many ways is still at the beginning. Yet, it remains the strategic foreign policy 
objective for all countries in the region. In addition – and perhaps even more 
importantly – the prospective membership of the EU is now the main force behind 
domestic political and economic reforms in countries which have only recently left 
the wars and conflicts behind. Further stabilisation and democratisation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina largely depends on success of transition from the initial ‘Dayton’ phase 
in which the peace and stability were the main priority, to the second – ‘Brussels’ – 
phase in which the power will be gradually transferred from international supervisory 
bodies to democratically elected Bosnian institutions. The prospect of EU 
membership for Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the main forces of cohesion and 
stability in this country today. In Serbia and Montenegro, the EU plays the role of an 
impartial arbiter in disputes between these two republics. Although the EU might yet 
be unable to prevent disintegration of this federation into two separate states, it is 
almost certain that neither of two republics will take decisive steps without 
considering possible consequences of separation (or re-integration) for the future of 
Serbian and Montenegrin relations with the EU. The EU is also directly involved in 
negotiations on final status of Kosovo. Similarly, its direct involvement in 
Macedonian crisis in 2001 resulted in the EU-drafted ‘Ohrid Agreement’, which 
restructured Macedonia as practically a bi-national state. Thus, despite initial failure 
to prevent wars and conflicts in the early 1990s, the EU is now playing a constructive 
role in the region. But, the key to this success is not in a threat of coercion, but in 
attractiveness of the reward it can (can it?) offer to all countries in the Western 
Balkans. If in the second half of the 1990s the ‘stick’ helped ending the wars in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in the first decade of the 21st century the ‘carrot’ of 
full EU membership is more likely to secure stability and enhance democracy in the 
Western Balkans. The main price, the one that all countries of the region now desire, 
is – full membership of the EU. For the countries of the region, only the full 
membership of the EU can be seen as recognition of ‘normality’, i.e. as confirmation 
that the period of instability followed by (sometimes humiliating) international 
supervision over domestic policy processes is over. Political elites of the countries of 
Western Balkans – but also the large segment of the population – sees the 
membership as the end of a long and painful transition from the status of a disorderly 
and undesirable neighbour to status of an equal partner and a ‘member of the club’. 
After centuries of various authoritarian (and even totalitarian) regimes sitting on the 
fence that divides ‘Europe’ and Others, the countries of the Western Balkans are now 
hoping to be offered a seat around the same table with all (most) other fellow 
Europeans – and thus to be treated as equal to everybody else.    
 
However, with recent institutional crises and uncertainties over future size and shape 
of the European Union, the question remains: what if the EU could not deliver on its 
‘open doors’ policy towards the countries of the Western Balkans? Among the 
officials on both sides (i.e. within the EU and in the countries concerned) there is a 
degree of denial that this could happen. Although cautiously avoiding to specify any 
date for entry of the countries of the Western Balkans into the European Union, in 
public the EU officials remain optimistic: sooner or later they will all become 
members. But, how convincing is this optimism in the view of difficulties that the 
European Union is facing internally? In the immediate aftermath of its 2004 
enlargement, the European Union seems to be divided (perhaps more than ever 
before) over major policy issues – not only over further enlargement (especially with 
regard to Turkey), and its Constitutional Treaty, but also over the war in Iraq and 
relations with the United States. In this situation, there is a realistic danger that to an 
increasing number of people in the Western Balkans the EU loses some of its 
attractiveness. In addition, a new wave of anti-immigration rhetoric and recent 
successes of far-right parties in a number of EU countries could discourage liberal 
pro-European forces in countries of the Western Balkans. After all, the nationalist 
anti-European forces in all countries of the Western Balkans already compare the 
European Union with former Yugoslavia (and even with the former USSR), arguing 
that such a complex multi-ethnic political structures simply cannot survive. Internal 
crisis of the EU would therefore indirectly strengthen anti-European forces in the 
Western Balkans, which in turn could be damaging for the process of stabilisation and 
democratisation of the region. And vice versa, a more efficient European Union which 
remains committed to its policy of further enlargement and delivers upon it, will serve 
as the main force of stability and democracy in the Balkans. The future of the EU will 
have direct consequences for the stability of the Western Balkans – and if this stability 
is once again undermined, the European Union might find it even more difficult to 
manage it than it was fifteen years ago.  
 
This special edition focusses on the next wave of enlargement of the European Union, 
which should include countries of the Western Balkans. It is based on contributions 
which emerged from a conference workshop hosted by the Department of Politics at 
the University of Stirling in March 2004 and which comprised a wide range of 
academic specialists and practitioners from EU Member States and South East 
Europe. David Phinnemore’s contribution sets out the broad political debates 
surrounding the state of the EU enlargement debate in the aftermath of the 2004 
enlargement and the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and this is followed by 
contributions from Dimitar Bechev and Paul G.Hare who focus on the political and 
economic conditions in South East Europe and the impact of EU policy. The final 
contributions come from Gülnur Aybet and Dejan Jović who provide evaluations of 
Turkey and Croatia, the evolution of their policies towards the EU and prospects for 
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